Septimius Severus has long been maligned as the one whose reign, and the changes he set in motion, caused the turmoil of the third century and the decline of Rome. This view was exemplified by Gibbon, who made Severus the villain of his grand study.¹  Around the middle of this century that view began to change and modern scholars now acknowledge Severus as a reformer, although sometimes a ruthless one. What both viewpoints have in common is Severus as the agent of change. However the traditional elements of Severus' rule are often overlooked. A period where he needed to utilize as many traditional factors of the emperor's position as he could was in 193 while he was initially establishing his rule before going east to deal with Pescennius Niger.

    The last years of Commodus' reign had left the political situation in Rome in such a shambles that no person or group was able to put together a government with enough auctoritas to retain power in the fashion that was customary in the principate. Both Pertinax and Julianus, on the basis of their experience, had the potential to put together a lasting settlement, yet met premature ends. At this time Severus needed to do whatever was necessary to cement his rule and begin the process of creating his own government, something his legions could not do alone. He did this by appealing to the traditional elements of the emperor's role in order to begin the process of building up his auctoritas as emperor.

    The auctoritas of the emperor was the linchpin of his position in a way of governing that essentially was extra-constitutional.²  An astute emperor could use the great influence of his auctoritas to bring together divergent elements under his rule. By the 2nd century the ways in which an emperor built up and utilized his auctoritas had become traditional. The exemplar of how a 2nd century emperor created, maintained and utilized auctoritas was Marcus Aurelius. By handling the senate with deference, treating the people of Rome right and using marriages to ally his family with the leading men of the day, he brought a large spectrum of Roman society behind him and led Rome through a series of difficult periods. His memory was fresh in 193 and the appeals Pertinax and Severus made to it indicates how great his auctoritas was and how they wanted to appropriate it for themselves.

    It will be helpful to took at the brief reigns of Pertinax and Julianus to see where the emperors sought support, whether they received it and what others forces were in play in Rome before Severus arrived on the scene. Pertinax, the son of a freedman, at first sight would seem to be unlikely man to become emperor. However, he was among the most outstanding of a new group of leaders, judged on ability alone, who arose under Marcus Aurelius.³  With vast experience and prestigious backing, Pertinax had the potential to exercise the type of auctoritas that an emperor would need to restore the governance of Rome after the chaotic last years of Commodus. His key support came from the aristocracy that had been created during Marcus Aurelius' reign. This can seen in his almost immediate association of his rule with Claudius Pompeianus and Acillius Glabrio. These two senators represented the highest possible station of the Antonine aristocracy. Pompeianus, Pertinax' early patron, was Marcus' son-in-law and chief lieutenant. Also he had refused to participate in the senate during Commodus' reign. Glabrio was from the last remaining Republican consular family and also may have been related to the imperial family.⁴  Association with leading members of the venerated Antonine aristocracy symbolized a return to the ways of Marcus which would have a very broad appeal.

    The support that the Antonine aristocracy could organize is seen immediately after Commodus' murder, with a large crowd clamoring for Pertinax when he went before the troops at the pratorian camp.⁵  This played a large role in securing the guards approval of Pertinax; the fact that he had seek to approval from the guard is indicative of the breakdown of a rational power structure in the city. Though the guard had hailed Pertinax emperor, the approval and grant of the imperial powers by the senate were the traditional steps that officially made a man the emperor. Before the senate, besides publicly associating himself with Pompeianus and Glabrio, Pertinax made a customary refusal of title, before accepting the traditional titles and powers.⁶  He also took the unique title princeps senatus.⁷  Here Pertinax took a special step to reassure the senate that they were to be accorded all due respect.

    Despite have considerable prestigious backing, taking several measures to return governance to a more regular basis and doing things to ensure the support of the people, Pertinax met a premature fate.⁸  Ever the stern old general, much like Galba on becoming emperor in 69, in his attempts to return efficient government to Rome, he had quickly alienated the military forces in Rome, who had long been accustomed to lax and favorable treatment under Commodus.⁹  That the senate, troops on the frontiers and people perceived him as a legitimate ruler is seen in the repeated use Severus was soon to make of his name and what he stood for.

    Out of all the figures who play a significant role in 193, Didius Julianus held the most traditional qualifications for a prospective emperor. Coming from a patrician family, being associated with the imperial family from a young age and having held a good portion of the most desirable posts in the empire,¹⁰ Julianus would seem to have the necessary background and knowledge to create and use the auctoritas of an emperor. Instead the picture the sources portray is a man who consistently alienated the senate and people. During Julianus' confirmation appearance before the senate the people of the city were outside clamoring against him. They soon went to circus and called for Niger.¹¹  Clearly he faced organized opposition from the outset and did not have the power or auctoritas to control it. However some of the more outlandish elements of his reign were probably reflections of later Severan propaganda and typical of the way the senatorial tradition of writing history portrayed a 'bad' emperor. With his professional and family background, Julianus could hardly have ignored the senate as much as he is given credit for.¹²  The infamous auction before the guard is indicative more of the decay of a proper power structure in the city of Rome than any special perfidy of Julianus.¹³  The chaos that characterized his reign was most likely due to the reality of Severus' army being on the horizon, than to Julianus behaving in non-Roman fashion.

    Severus was an unlikely man to begin an imperial bid in 193. His career had been successful, but not outstanding and he had little in common with he type of men who rose to the forefront under Marcus Aurelius. His career up to 193 has been termed that of a bureaucrat with a legal background.¹⁴  Also he had little real military experience. At the time he was hailed imperator he was little known in Rome,¹⁵ he faced a new emperor who was yet an unknown quantity, and people in the city had already called on Niger. Yet he moved decisively and effectively when he heard that Pertinax had fallen. The view that he was in collusion with the backers of Pertinax as a military reinforcement fits some of circumstances well.¹⁶  However nowhere is he joined with those leaders who were publicly associated with Pertinax and his continual public appeals to the memory of the fallen emperor indicate that he did not feel their support was certain. The leaders who do play a role in Severus' early years of power were mostly men stationed on the frontier nearby when he began the endeavor,¹⁷ which suggest that he was not the representative of well organized party in Rome. Severus needed to appeal to traditional Roman sensibilities because his bid for power lacked several key elements needed to build a government: essentials that both of his immediate predecessors possessed in greater quantity.

    A key element in ancient propaganda was omens. As with other emperors who rose to the purple there were a number of omen stories that presaged Severus' imperial power.¹⁸  Dio even devoted his first work to this topic.¹⁹  Whether they actually occurred is not important; Severus knew that the people, even more superstitious in a time of uncertainty, would believe them. It is not known whether any of the surviving stories were current in 193, but they are the type of thing that Severus would want circulating at this crucial time. With this perceived supernatural sanction Severus took an important step towards enhancing his position with the people, hopefully bring them under his auctoritas.

    The cornerstone of Severus' bid for power in 193 was the legions he had in Pannonia and those he was able to win to his cause on the Danube and Rhine. This, combined with events later in his reign, has caused Severus to be reviled as the first of the soldier-emperors. At the root of this view is historians looking forward to the disturbed years of the third century, rather back at the heritage of the principate. The legions were the key to the power of such 'good' emperors as Augustus and Vespasian, who used this force to open the door to power and allowed them to build a political settlement of a more lasting nature.²⁰  The legions also stood behind other emperors who did not need to apply this force to the domestic political situation. Likewise Severus used his legions as a way to barge his way into a position where he could hope to build a lasting settlement in a political landscape that was is disarray.

    His position as the commander of three legions, the ones closest to Rome, did not automatically ensure their enthusiastic participation or that of the other legions. Severus began by canvassing his subordinate leaders and having them go back to their troops to build a ground swell of support that resulted in him being hailed as imperator on April 9, 193.²¹  Upon being hailed by the troops he added the name of Pertinax to his own.²²  The central theme of his bid for the troops support, and throughout 193, was the need to avenge Pertinax. Pertinax was certainly popular with troops but this also speaks to how much he was perceived as legitimate throughout the empire and his image could hopefully be tapped as a source of auctoritas for Severus.

    One of Severus' first moves was to offer the position of Caesar to Clodius Albinus.²³  The ancient authors cast doubt on the sincerity of this appointment.²⁴  The later war between the two and Severus' summary treatment of Albinus' later supporters certainly makes the offer seem duplicitous: a simple ploy that protected his rear while he went east to deal with Niger. However there were other considerations that also made this a prudent move. When Severus tendered his offer to Albinus he had yet to eliminate Julianus and did not know what type of resistance he would face in Italy. Also the character of Severus' rule was unknown to those in Rome. In the late 2nd century Rome had known almost a hundred years where all the emperors, except Commodus, had been adopted by their predecessor. By appointing a capable and known junior college as a possible successor Severus was showing those who may still have been undecided that he taking measures to insure stable government and acting in a traditional manner. After Severus secured his position in Rome he was willing to back up his choice of Albinus with deeds; appointing Albinus as his consular college for 194 and allowing him to coin and set up statues.²⁵  The appointment of Albinus was done for more reasons that just to secure his rear; Severus had made a shrewd move to enhance his political position at a delicate time. His mistake may have been choosing a man too popular.

    Severus march on Rome was swift and efficient, which would seem to imply that he had a tight control over his troops.²⁶  However the sources report trouble with the troops once they were in Rome.²⁷  This calls into question how much control Severus had over them. Possibly their misbehavior was a simple case of frontier troops being let loose in the big city. More likely, given the efficiency fo his march on Rome, Severus loosened the reigns on them as a reminder to both the senate and the people of what could happen if they got out of line.

    Besides employing the persuasive power of his army, Severus also used his troops to eliminate the pratorian guard.²⁸  The elimination of the existing guard and his institution of a restructured guard was the first reform of Severus' reign. Their position as the eminent armed force in the city of Rome and self-serving attitude had resulted in a situation where no one in 193 had been able to build up enough auctoritas to effectively control the situation in Rome, let alone the empire. Once they were out of the way, Severus was in a position where he could work on building up his own auctoritas without having to look over his shoulder for the guard.

    In his all important session before the senate Severus emphasized traditional themes and associated himself with Marcus Aurelius and Pertinax. Severus stated his purpose in his actions as the avenging of Pertinax.²⁹  He also took the oath not to put senators to death and had it confirmed by a decree.³⁰  This oath, whether followed or not, had become a traditional part of the beginning of on emperor's reign since Nerva.³¹  Severus also proclaimed that he would usher in a period of prosperity with Marcus and Pertinax the model for his actions.³²  In deferring to the senate Severus was trying appear as a traditional emperor and bring over to himself the essence of the still very real respect for Marcus.

    To further reinforce these themes Severus held a grand ceremonial funeral for Pertinax, whom Severus had already deified. Dio was witness to an elaborate funeral ceremony for Pertinax conducted by Severus with the senate, the equestrian order and troops arrayed in attendance.³³  Importantly there were images of famous figures from Rome's past in the funeral procession. This specifically played to Roman veneration for the past and associated Pertinax and himself with the honored heroes of Rome's history. He also created a new priesthood to honor Pertinax.³⁴  Here once again Severus, in a venue that probably included all ranks of society in Rome, was putting forth his message that he stood for traditional Roman values. In institutionalizing the memory of the Pertinax, Severus was also hoping that Romans would remember the man responsible for it.

    Before leaving for the east to deal with Niger, Severus undertook a few actions that can best be described as the emperor playing his traditional role. He reformed the grain supply for the city of Rome,³⁵ a very important task for the emperor if he wished the people, who had shown support for Niger, to be on his side.³⁶  He put on games, another important thing the emperor did for the people to keep them diverted and on his side.³⁷  He freed his friends from debt and gave donatives to the soldiers and people.³⁸  He also heard lawsuits,³⁹ one of the chief functions the emperor performed. Severus also began appointing his own men to the senate, one the emperor's traditional prerogatives.⁴⁰  One other item that probably did not take place is recorded in the Severus vita is indicative of the tone that Severus set while in Rome. The author of the HA tells of Severus giving his daughters in marriage and designating their husbands consuls.⁴¹  The problem is that nowhere else is Severus recorded as having daughters. Using marriage alliances with other leading families was a standard way for an emperor to build up his auctoritas. That the author of the HA or his source could invent this is due to the success of Severus in playing the emperor's role while in Rome. Almost as if the author thought that because Severus had done so many traditional things while in Rome, he must have brought other families into his own also.

    During this crucial period Severus needed to be seen doing as many traditional aspects of the emperor's role in order to make building his government as smooth as possible. His legions were the tool he used to acquire his power, but he knew that they could not be the lasting solution to governing the empire. He also would have to face Niger, who had demonstrated organized support in the city. Any leadrs and groups he could nudge towards his auctoritas would make his task more likely of success. When Severus left for the east no one knew how things would turn out, least of all himself. The only basis the people in Rome had to judge his rule was what they had just seen of him. What he tried to do in 193 was play the traditional role of the emperor in order to bring as many elements of society in Rome toward his auctoritas as possible. In the short term he was successful; the sources report no trouble in Rome during the conflict with Niger.

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1 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. Bury. (London, 1897), 125.  Back

2 In his study of Augustus' position within the Roman state, R. Syme, said, "Beyond and above all legal prescriptions stands auctoritas." The Roman Revolution. (Oxford, 1939), 322.  Back

3 Pertinax' career, HA Pert. 1.1-4.4, was one of the most outstanding of the empire and now one of the most commented upon. The most important works are: H. Kolbe, "Der Pertinaxstein aus Bruhl." Bonner Jahrbucher 162 (1962), 407-420 and G. Alfoldy, "P. Helvius Pertinax und M. Valerius Maximianus." Situla 14/5 (1974), 199-215. Reprinted, with comments on reactions to the work in an addenda, in Romische Heeresgeschicte. Beitrage 1962-1985. (Amsterdam, 1987), 326-48. A good summary is in A. Birley, The African Emperor. Septimius Severus. (London, 1988), 63-67. On Antonine career patterns see G. Alfoldy, Konsulat und Senatorstand unter den Antoninen. Prosopographische Untersuchungen zur senatorischen Fuhrungsschicht. (Bonn, 1987), his summary in English, "Consuls and Consulars under the Antonines: Prosopography and History." Ancient Society 7 (1976), 263-99 and P. Leunissien, Konsuln und Konsulare und der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (180-235 n.Chr.). Prosopographische Untersuchungen zur senatorischen Elite im romischen Kaiserreich. (Amsterdam, 1989).  Back

4 Pertinax with Pompeianus, HA Pert. 4.10, with Glabrio, Her. 2.3.3-4 and with both, Dio 74.3.3-4 (All Dio citations use the text numbering of the Loeb edition). A. Birley, "The Coup d'Etats of the Year 193." Bonner Jahrbucher 169 (1969): 250-2, expanding on suggestions by M. Platnauer, The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus. (Oxford, 1918), 55 and M. Hammond, "Septimius Severus, Roman Bureaucrat." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 51 (1940):166, makes a strong case for Pertinax' involvement with Laetus and Eclectus in the plot, which was later masked by Severan propaganda. C. Whittaker, "The Revolt of Papirius Dionysius." Historia 13 (1964), 356-7, convincingly argues that Pompeianus and Glabrio were the powers behind the plot. E. Champlin, "Notes on the Heirs of Commodus." American Journal of Philology 100 (1979), 288-306, makes a case that Pertinax was acting as a caretaker for a young member of the imperial family, citing Pertinax' age and birth as an being unlikely choice for founding a dynasty, his association with Pompeianus and Glabrio, who he counts as a member of the extended imperial family and Pertinax' refusal of imperial titles for his wife and son.   Back

5 Pertinax before the guard, HA Pert. 4.5-8; Her. 2.2.1; Dio 74.1.2-3. Whittaker (1964), 356 sees the Antonine aristocracy, with their large clientela, the more likely organizers of the demonstration than Laetus and Eclectus.   Back

6 Refusal, Her. 2.3.3; Dio 74.1.4. Titles and powers, HA Pert. 5.5-6; Her. 2.3.11; Dio 74.5.1.  Back">Back

7 Dio 74.5.1.  Back

8 HA Pert. 6.8-9.3; Her. 2.4.2, 6-8; Dio 74.5.1-2, 4-5.  Back

9 Alienated forces, HA Pert. 6.1, 3-4, 10.8-10; Her. 2.4.4, 2.5.1; Dio 74.8.1-2, 9.1-2. Tried to change too quick, 74.10.3.  Back

10 On Julianus' career, HA Jul. 1.1-2.3; CIL 6.1.1401; J. Eadie, "The Reliability and Origin of the Vita Didii Iuliani." Annali della Scualoa Normale 4 (1974): 1418-21 and J. Leaning, "Didius Julianus and his Biographer." Latomus 49 (1989): 552-55. Interestingly the only mention of an attempt by Julianus to associate himself with the Antonine aristocracy is his offer to share the empire with Pompeianus when Severus' army is practically at the gates of Rome, HA Jul. 8.3. This seems unlikely, given his long association with and service to the imperial family, and the type of thing Severan propaganda may have suppressed.  Back

11 HA Jul. 4.6-7; Her. 2.7.2-3; Dio 74.13.3-5.  Back

12 Eadie, 1413.  Back

13 Leaning regards Julianus' winning bid as no more than a standard donative for the time, 557-8.  Back

14 Hammond, 137-173. Other studies of Severus' career: J. Hasebroek, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Septimius Severus. (Heidelberg, 1921),1-11; M. Platnauer (1918), 38-53; T. Barnes, "The Family and Career of Septimius Severus." Historia 16 (1967), 87-107; A. Birley, "Some Notes on HA Severus, 1-4." Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloquium 7 (1968/9), 59-77; A. Birley (1969), 253-260; and A. Birley (1988), 37-56, 68-78, 83-4.  Back

15 Hammond, 164.  Back

16 Hammond, 165; A, Birley (1969), 261; and A. Birley (1988), 83-4.  Back

17 Birley (1969), 261-65 and Birley (1988), 97. A. Graham, "Septimius Severus and his Generals, 193-7." In M. Foot ed., Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western, 1928-71. (London, 1973), 261-266 notes that several who were early subordinates of Severus had been undistinguished up to that time.  Back

18 HA Sev. 1.6-10, 3.4-5, 4.6; Her. 2.9.4-6; and Dio 75.5.1-3.  Back

19 Dio 73.23.1.  Back

20 G. Walser, "Die Beurteilung des Septimius Severus in der alteren und neueren Forschung." Museum Helveticum 30 (1973): 111, where he also makes the point that this negative view of Severus reflects the senatorial historical tradition.  Back

21 Her. 2.9.7-10. Dies imperii, Birley (1971), 159.  Back

22 Her. 2.10.1.  Back

23 Dio 74.15.1.  Back

24 Her. 2.15.2-3,5; Dio 74.15.1.  Back

25 Consul, HA Alb. 6.8, accepted by Birley (1988), 106n36. Coins and statues, Her. 2.15.5. Albinus' coinage from 193-4 in P. Hill The Coinage of Septimius Severus and his Family of the Mint of Rome, A.D. 193-217. (London, 1964), 16-17.  Back

26 HA Sev. 5.3; Her. 2.11.1-7; Dio 74.15.2-3.  Back

27 HA Sev. 7.3-6-7; Dio 75.2.3.  Back

28 HA Sev. 6.11; Her. 2.13.1-12; Dio 75.1.1-2.  Back

29 Her. 2.14.3.  Back

30 HA Sev. 7.5; Dio 75.2.1  Back.

31 A. Birley. "The Oath not to put Senators to Death." Classical Review 76 (1962), 177-9.  Back

32 Her. 2.14.3.  Back

33 Dio 75.4.1-5.5.  Back

34 HA Sev. 7.8.  Back

35 HA Sev. 8.5. Birely (1988), 106n36, doubts this, Platnauer, (1918), 70n4, postulated that perhaps a good spring harvest came in then.  Back

36 Whittaker, 349, though not discussing this particular instance said, "Severus . . . took every possible step to ensure popular support in Rome."  Back

37 Her. 2.14.5.  Back

38 Debt, HA Sev. 8.1; Donatives, Her. 2.14.5.  Back

39 HA Sev. 8.4.  Back

40 Birley (1988), 106-7.  Back

41 HA Sev. 8.1-2.  Back

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